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1 What Are Foundations? 
Surely we want solid foundations. What kind of castle 
can we build on sand? What is the point of devoting 
effort to balconies and minarets, if the foundation may be 
so weak as to allow the structure to collapse of its own 
weight? We want our foundations set on bedrock, 
designed to last for generations. Who would want an 
architect who cannot certify the soundness of the 
foundations of his buildings? 
The architectural analogy is not entirely persuasive, 
though. It is easy to understand what the foundations of 
a building are: they are the steel pilings, the stone, the 
concrete, on which the rest of the edifice physically 
stands. It stands still. Science is not like that. It is 
living, dynamic, constantly changing. The foundations of 
a part of science are themselves open to change. 
So what are the foundations of a branch of science? There 
are the first principles, that everyone can and does (at 
least for the time being) agree on. The axioms of the 
discipline. Often these foundations are provided by a 
different branch of science. Thus engineering takes for 
granted - uses as a foundation - statics, kinematics, 
dynamics... In that sense the foundations of uncertainty 
clearly include logic and mathematics: we don't need to 
invent the real number system for ourselves. 
But there may be something more we want, something 
more domain specific, on which we can build our science. 
Some key idea, like the idea of 'force' in physics, or of a 
'neighborhood' in topology. We have yet to agree on any 
such idea or set of ideas: we argue with each other and 
interrogate our intuitions. And disagree at length. We 
would liked to find relations, common elements, among 
the diverse ideas with which we work. But there is no 
unified theory, no general framework to which we can 
turn to see the relation between one idea and another. 
At the same time, though, we do manage to put together 
useful systems in which uncertainty figures. In fact 
people with intense and widely divergent views 
regarding the nature of uncertainty have been successful 
in making practical use of their ideas regarding 
uncertainty, its measurement, procedures for updating 
uncertainty, its role in decision making, etc. How is this 
possible? How can you do something right if you start 
off on the wrong foot? Clearly, since each of n people 
thinks the other n - 1 are wrong, not more than one can be 
proceeding correctly. And yet they are getting at least 
part way to their goals. 
2 Do We Need Foundations At All? 
In this situation it is easy enough to see why some people 
are willing to say that we should not bother with 
foundations at all. A similar situation can be found in 
logic and mathematics: there are those who d o  
mathematics, and then there are those who do a different 
thing- the foundations of mathematics. "It's all very 
interesting," one might say, "to speculate about 
foundations, but it's not serious work." 
In fact this attitude can be raised to the level of a matter 
of principle. Of course we should be explicit about what 
our models contain, but it need not be the case that there 
is any privileged class of models. Different models are 
useful for different things. To seek a unification of or a 
foundation for modelling uncertainties is, it might be 
argued, completely misguided. It can only inhibit free 
and untrammeled and creative research. "Let a thousand 
flowers bloom!" 
There is a movement in the philosophy of science that 
leads in the same direction. It can be traced to Paul 
Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn [Feyerabend, 1970, Kuhn, 
1952], and the gist of the view is that science is driven by 
practical and also by social goals. The community of 
scientists accepts a certain 'disciplinary matrix' that 
embodies rules of evidence, criteria of sound argument, 
and the like, but these standards change over time. When 
it comes to science itself, there is no truth of the matter. 
Scientific argument, for example about the conservation 
of parity or the measurement of belief, is a formal dance, 
conforming to temporary rules of argument. 
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This is a perennial view. A number of years ago, the idea 
was that there were always 'presuppositions,' so that if 
you made your presuppositions explicit, you had 
exercised full foundational responsibility. If my 
presuppositions differ from yours, why, we have no 
disagreement after all: one would not expect to reach the 
same substantive conclusions on the basis of differing 
presuppositions. 
So too, more recently, with the idea of a 'model.' If I 
argue that the evidence supports the hypothesis that 
people are expected utility maximizers, and you argue 
that the evidence doesn't either support that hypothesis, 
what we must do is to sit down and carefully 
characterize the models we are respectively employing. 
Lo and behold: we find that they are not the same model, 
so of course we are not really disagreeing. What is true 
on your model is false on mine, and vice versa. 
What is nice about all these anti-foundational ploys is 
that they promote friendship and collegiality; they can be 
used very effectively to resolve disagreements. After all, 
if we are using different models of uncertainty, why 
should we expect to come to the same conclusions? 
3 Testability 
There are a number of difficulties with the soft friendly 
world of relativism. For one thing, it conflicts with the 
persistent nagging feeling that, by gum, there is a truth of 
the matter out there. We know there is, because we have 
knocked into tables, fallen out of trees, gotten rained on. 
Reality isn't all bad. We have also basked in the sun, 
made love, seen magnificent sunsets. The point is that 
those things, good and bad, are not social constructs: they 
are the world going about its business. 
The view that we must answer to the world as well as to 
our colleagues is an old and honorable one. Rudolf 
Camap, among others, proposed testability as a criterion 
for meaningfulness in the theory of language. [Camap, 
1934] Construed narrowly, the idea of testability is 
implausible: there are many statements in science that we 
cannot definitively test. Any universal generalization 
provides an illustration: we cannot complete an 
inventory of the universe. Construed broadly, testability 
might be thought of as the demand that any meaningful 
statement should be such that you can find evidence 
supporting it. This begins to get pretty vague. 
Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of 
meaningfulness. It didn't fare much better. But in both 
cases, it is assumed that there is a truth of the matter in 
these controversial issues, and one that is worth pursuing. 
4 Proliferation and Communication 
The idea that we want to encourage uninhibited creativity 
in formulating theories and devising structures to 
represent the world and the act! vitles of intelligent 
entities in the world is not at all peculiar to the anti­
foundational view. Popper and Camap, for example, both 
stressed the importance of speculation and invention. The 
question is partly that of whether or not there are 
objective standards for evaluating speculations and 
inventions. 
The question is also partly one of communication: it is 
not only the acceptability or unacceptability of some 
statement or other, but a question of the very meaning of 
that statement. If you and I have different paradigms (or 
models, or assumptions) then when you assert that our 
robot should be designed to maximize expected utility, 
and I assert that it should not merely maximize expected 
utility, we can agree that our disagreement is only 
apparent, and derives from the difference in our 
assumptions. When you assert that our robot will avoid 
risk, how am I to understand that? Without a common 
framework, how do we even express our differences? 
In choosing among alternative frameworks, the external 
world provides a powerful input, according to tra­
ditional views. What has been less noticed is that 
without a shared framework that is tied to the world, we 
cannot communicate. We can smile and nod, but the 
empirical value of what you say is lost on me. 
Unbounded proliferation, the proliferation of private 
languages applicable, to all intents and purposes to 
private worlds, is clearly counterproductive. We can't 
get very far that way, because we can't communicate and 
cooperate. That is one reason why we need to consider 
foundations. 
5 Considering Foundations 
What is it to 'consider foundations?' One might think it 
a matter of consulting one's intuitions, and trying to 
formalize them. Perhaps that is one approach, and if 
pursued with an awareness of both the history of the 
subject, and with an alertness to applications in the real 
world, it can be very interesting. 
There are other ways of thinking about foundations that 
involve looking carefully at ready-made systems. For 
example, authors often argue that other systems are 
"special cases" of their own. Shafer [Shafer, 1976] shows 
that Bayesian propositional probabilities are a special 
case of his belief functions. It goes the other way, too. 
Dempster [Dempster, 1965] mentions the possibility that 
his upper and lower probabilities could be construed as 
the envelope of a set of classical probability functions, 
and cites Savage as having suggested that these could be 
considered convex sets. 
The same general view has been endorsed by Isaac Levi 
[Levi, 1984] under the rubric of "indeterminate 
probabilities." 
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David Heckerman [Heckerman, 1985] has shown that 
MYCIN's certainty factors should (if they are to be fed 
into decision procedures) be construed in a manner 
consistent with propositional probabilities. 
Updating uncertainties in the light of evidence is a quite 
different matter. It can be shown that in many cases 
updating belief functions results in tighter constraints 
on uncertainty measures than does updating according to 
Bayes' theorem applied to propositional probabilities 
[Kyburg, 1989]. 
One way in which one might want to resolve some of 
these questions is to adopt the principle of maximizing 
expected utility as a constraint: that is, it should not be 
the case that the expected utility of an admissible act, 
under any point-valued probability function that is a 
possibility, is less in every state of nature than the 
expected utility of some other act. 
These results concern the relation of convex sets of 
probability measures to certainty factors or belief 
functions. This suggests that one might, more deeply, 
consider the question of whether convex sets of 
probability functions are the most useful general 
representation of uncertainty. Grounds for a negative 
answer can be found (implicitly) in Pearl's work [Pearl, 
1989]. Consider a chance event such as the tossing of a 
coin. We could be uncertain as to the bias of the coin, but 
at the same time quite certain as to the independence of 
the tosses. Since the convex combination of two 
binomial distributions of heads is not a binomial 
distribution, we do not want to identify rational belief 
with 
Another foundational issue is whether Bayes' theorem 
should be applied to the updating of probabilities. This is 
considered in [Dubois, 1988] as well as [Kyburg, 1990]. 
6 What Are We Trying to Do? 
Different people have different ideas of the goal of 
modelling uncertainty. Some people are mainly con­
cerned with the representation of human cognition. 
Others want machines that will handle an uncertain 
environment with efficiency and grace. These may be two 
quite different projects (though, presumably, related in 
some degree). They may call for somewhat different 
foundational considerations. 
For example, if we are interested in how people manage 
to deal with uncertainty, the idea of a connectionist 
network may be a very useful one: perhaps that is the 
basic mechanism we need to embody. 
On the other hand, if we are interested in machines that 
will deal with statistically known uncertain envi­
ronments, then it may well be that a different foundation 
is called for: one which depends on a database of 
statistical knowledge, rather than on being trained by the 
environment. 
The contrast is that between programming a machine to 
do logic, and constructing a network (which has been 
done) that will learn logic. I understand that a network 
has been constructed that learns logic at about the "B" 
level. It is easy to construct a program that will do logic 
much better. Which you are interested in depends on your 
goals. I'm more interested in a pocket calculator that 
does sums correctly than in one that gets a "B" in third 
grade arithmetic, but does it the way children do. 
7 What Are We Talking About? 
One reason for concern with foundations in modelling 
uncertainty is to enable us to know what we are talking 
about. If we don't have some foundational framework, 
some commonality, communication is undermined. If 
you use 'probability' in one sense and I use it in another, it 
is clear that we're in for problems. One response has been 
to proliferate terminology. Thus 'epistemic probability' 
'belief function' 'basic probability assignment' 'certainty 
factor' 'support' ... 
But the proliferation of terminology is not necessarily 
the proliferation of ideas, and does not always enhance 
communication. It is true that it may help to eliminate 
or reduce miscommunication: I won't misinterpret you if 
you are talking your own language, but avoiding 
misunderstanding is not the same as successfully 
communicating. 
Is communication so important? Might we proceed 
along an evolutionary model, in which each of us pursues 
his own dream, designs his own systems, and eventually, 
is evaluated by the success of his work? Should we let 
the thousand flowers bloom, and then let all but one 
wither? This doesn't seem like science. (Furthermore, if 
all but one is to die, we'd better make sure that it is self 
fertile.) 
8 Little but the Truth 
If, as I think most of us really believe, there is a truth of 
the matter about the nature (or natures!) of uncertainty, 
about its representation, and about its modification by 
evidence or the course of experience (not necessarily the 
same thing), then foundational issues are clearly 
important. The closer we can come to an adequate 
foundation, the more likely we are to be telling the truth 
when we talk about uncertainty. 
This is not at all to say that there is a final foundation, 
any more than there is a final.foundation to physics or to 
mathematics. It is to say that our work concerning 
uncertainty will be less likely to contain error. What we 
pass on will be more likely to be permanent. 
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9 More of the Truth 
We're not merely interested in avoiding falsehoods, 
however; we are interesting in telling the truth. A better 
understanding of foundations cannot help but provide 
insights from which more new results can be obtained. 
This is particularly the case when the foundational work 
has shown that two apparently different concepts are 
simple transformations of one another. Every theorem 
about the one becomes, with the appropriate 
transformations, a theorem about the other. 
For example, once we have noted that every belief 
function is equivalent to a convex set of classical 
probabilities, then theorems concerning convex sets of 
classical probabilities can be applied to belief functions. 
10 Usefulness 
We have already noted that, despite the strong divergence 
of opinion concerning foundations, individuals in a wide 
variety of camps have managed to produce useful systems, 
ranging from concrete applications in expert systems to 
purely abstract shells for representing uncertain 
inference. This strongly suggests that there is an 
interesting foundational core underlying those 
applications. 
It does not entail that there is a unified foundation; 
maybe there are k foundations for k kinds of uncertainty. 
That's just one of the foundational issues that deserves 
careful and generous investigation. 
If that is the case, however, if these successful appli­
cations reflect a unified common core of facts about 
uncertainty, then having a better understanding of the 
foundations will provide us with tools for doing things 
even better. 
This observation goes both ways. The more useful 
applications there are of a certain sort, the stronger the 
evidence that there is something right in what is being 
done. This fact should be exploited in the study of 
foundations. Its exploitation can be neither mechanical 
nor trivial, however. It is all too easy to take one 
framework, and to show how a second can be paraphrased 
in terms of the frrst. 
This is especially the case for the subjectivist Bayesian 
view. If there is a system that yields decisions on the 
basis of evidential inputs, and if as I suggested decision 
procedures should not conflict with probabilities, then it 
is necessarily the case that there are subjective prior 
probabilities that yield the same decisions. 
Does this mean that subjective Bayesianism is the 
Universal Solvent? Hardly, because there are other 
desiderata than conformity to the probability calculus 
that are or may be part of our search for foundations. 
11 Practise and Theory 
This suggests that practise and theory should go hand in 
hand. We can engineer applications involving uncertainty 
that work. We can do so starting from a variety of 
theoretical and philosophical viewpoints. In view of that 
variety, we can hardly claim support, on this basis, for 
any particular foundational view. 
On the other hand, the space of possible foundational 
theories is very large. There is a lot more to be thought 
about than is involved in any particular engineering 
development. We must also consult our intuitions -
and those of others - in order to have reason to believe 
that our engineering successes are not accidents. 
This doesn't mean that foundational work is a matter of 
sitting in an armchair thinking deep thoughts. 
Philosophers are traditionally good at that. But unless 
the deep thoughts are tested, we can't tell what they have 
to offer us. Unless the intuitions obtained in the 
armchair can be put to the test of practise, they can have 
little persuasiveness. 
Practise and theory must go together; to get very far, 
they must go together systematically, not just acci­
dentally. 
12 A Garden 
A concern with foundations may be in some small degree 
conservative - at least in comparison with the radical 
view of Feyerabend. But there is no one that I know of, in 
any area, who takes the view that creativity and the 
proliferation of ideas are to be discouraged. Foundations, 
even where they exist, are not immutable and 
unchangeable. 
Nor does there have to be uniform agreement on the 
foundations of uncertainty modelling. The more uni­
formity we can find, the more agreement we can achieve, 
the better. A common framework allows us to 
communicate better, it allows us to transfer results from 
one part of the theory to another, and we may hope that 
eventually it will allow us to understand better why the 
systems that work do work. 
Finding a common framework within which many of the 
current ideas concerning the representation and updating 
of uncertainty can be related need not inhibit the 
proliferation of ideas. If we're lucky, it will enhance 
their effect by enhancing their communication. 
Let a thousand flowers bloom; but let them bloom 
together and cooperatively in a formal garden. 
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